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Cash Transfers and Migration: Evidence From an Online Survey Experiment

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Cash Transfers and Migration: Evidence From an Online Survey Experiment*

Abstract

State and locally-administered cash transfers have received growing interest in recent years as a means to address economic strain and inequality in the United States. A key consideration is whether new residents would be drawn to jurisdictions with cash transfers. We develop an online survey experiment to explore people's relative preference for—and willingness to move in order to receive—cash transfers. We find that state-administered cash transfers have broad support and are generally preferred to both tax cuts or additional public spending. These baseline results are reinforced by measuring people's stated and behavioral responses to learning about Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend program (the only large-scale universal cash-transfer program currently employed in the United States). Considered jointly with existing estimates of the tax-elasticity of interstate migration, our results suggest that state-administered cash-transfer programs implemented in the United States would likely attract new residents.

Keywords: Cash Transfers; Interstate Migration, Survey Experiment

JEL Classification: H2; H4; H5; R2; C8

1 Introduction

Direct cash transfers have received growing interest in recent years as a means to reduce poverty and inequality. Pilot programs have been implemented in cities like Oakland and Los Angeles, California. The Governor of California, Gavin Newsom, recently proposed spending thirty five million dollars supporting the implementation of local cash-transfer programs.[1] Proponents of cash-transfer programs argue they improve health outcomes (there is mixed evidence of this, see for example Gertler (2004); Sun et al. (2021); Miller et al. (2024)), reduce poverty (Barrientos and DeJong, 2006; Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008), increase education attainment (Benhassine et al., 2015; Taaffe et al., 2017), and improve a variety of outcomes for children (Gennetian et al., 2024; Gennetian and Magnuson, 2018; Gennetian et al., 2022; Fuller et al., 2022). Critics, however, argue that cash transfers reduce incentives to work (evidence for this claim is mixed, see for example Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2018); Del Boca et al. (2021); Bibler et al. (2023); Vivalt et al. (2024)) and attract people from other jurisdictions, increasing the cost of the program. As important as this last consideration is, there is little evidence of the migratory response to universal cash-transfer programs.

Existing literature suggests households move to receive monetary benefits including tax cuts (Oates, 1969; Gius, 2011; Cohen et al., 2014), health care subsidies (Alm and Enami, 2017a), and welfare more generally (Enchautegui, 1997; McKinnish, 2005, 2007a; Agersnap et al., 2020). Based off of these estimates, one may expect that a U.S. state-level program would cause similar inward migration. However, the migratory effects of cash transfers may be unique from other monetary drivers. Contrary to traditional economic assumptions, many studies have shown money is not fungible (Thaler, 1990; Cherry et al., 2002; Danková and Servátka, 2015). Rather, how much someone values it, how careful they are with it, and what they buy with it depends on how it was received. In the context of public finance, for

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[1]https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/california-budget-has-35-million-for-basic-income-pilot-programs

example, people are especially opposed to a monetary loss if it is framed as a "tax" (Sussman and Olivola, 2011).

Estimating the effect of universal cash-transfer programs on interstate migration using observed data is difficult given that such large-scale, unconditional cash-transfer programs are rare, and (with one exception) non-existent in the United States. We therefore designed a series of three survey experiments to gauge people's relative (stated) preference for—and willingness to move in order to receive—cash transfers. Experiment 1 elicits people's preferences for cash transfers relative to an equally-sized tax cuts or increases in government spending on education and healthcare. Experiment 2 elicits people's preferences for cash transfers relative to changes in the wage rate, the cost of living, and tax cuts in a modified context designed to mimic a real world scenario in which a person is considering moving and can possibly receive an added monetary reward as a result. Experiment 3 leverages the fact that a large-scale, universal cash-transfer program exists in the state of Alaska.[2] Respondents exposed to the cash-transfer treatment are informed about the nature and typical size of the cash transfers in Alaska. Respondents are then asked to describe their willingness to move to Alaska, and their expected life satisfaction of living there.

Considered jointly across the three survey experiments, a number of key insights emerge. First, public finance is not fungible; people state to prefer cash transfers to equal-sized tax cuts or spending. Second, on average, people's stated willingness to move to receive a cash transfer is greater than that for an equally-sized tax cut. Third, informing people of Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend program significantly increases their stated likelihood of moving to the state. Based of these findings, we conclude that existing estimates of the tax-elasticity of migration provide lower bound estimates of the interstate migratory effect of cash transfers.

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[2]Identifying the long run effect of Alaska's cash-transfer program on interstate migration is confounded by the historical timing of Alaskan events. The Trans-Alaska oil pipeline was completed in 1977, and this facilitated both the repeal of Alaska's state income tax in 1981, and the implementation of the PFD in 1980. While leveraging annual variation in the size of the PFD or the timing of its arrival is sensible for some research questions (e.g., short run labor market effects Bibler et al. (2019) or voter turnout Loeffler (2023); James et al. (2022)), it is not suitable for identifying migratory effects given such decisions are inherently long run.

For example, (Kennan and Walker, 2010) estimates the 5-year wage-migration elasticity is 0.5. Our results indicate the cash transfer-migration elasticity is at least this large, indicating a 10% increase in cash transfers causes a 5% increase in inward migration.[3]

2   Monetary migratory drivers

Among a number of theories for why people move, Lowry (1966) provides an early model of the migration decision where households weigh the costs and benefits of moving (Molloy et al., 2011). Subsequent studies build on this framework to show how particular costs and benefits drive migration decisions. Unsurprisingly, wage income matters considerably as shown by Kennan and Walker (2011) and Greenwood (1985). Kennan and Walker (2011) find a 5-year wage-migration elasticity of 0.5, implying that, over a 5-year window, a 10% increase in wages in a destination location relative to the origin, induces a 5% increase in migration between that location pair.

Other important financial incentives for migration include cost of living differentials, differential tax rates, and differences in the provision of public goods and services (e.g. the generosity of public assistance). Empirical evidence confirms the importance of the cost of living (Kennan and Walker, 2011) in general , and the cost of housing in particular Plantinga et al. (2013) in shaping migration behavior.

With respect to taxes, the existing literature primarily examines the impact of state or local fiscal policy on particular subgroups. For example, taxes matter considerably for super-star scientists (Moretti and Wilson, 2017) and athletes (Kleven et al., 2013) with elasticises of 0.85-1. These groups are important from a public revenue perspective when considering top marginal rates. However, these groups are unlikely to be representative of

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[3]Estimates of the tax-elasticity of migration are based on marginal variation in tax rates. Our focus is on the implementation of cash-transfer programs, not on marginal changes to the size of the cash transfers. There is little reason to think marginal effects would be similar to discrete ones. However, it is also likely that discrete changes (program implementation) offer larger monetary rewards, and garner more media attention, than marginal changes to existing programs. For example, many people may be aware that Alaska has a state-administered cash-transfer program, but are probably less aware of the size of the corresponding payments.

many other households in terms of mobility. Conway and Houtenville (2001) and Önder and Schlunk (2019) focus on the migration patterns of the elderly, and find they are attracted to states with favorable tax regimes. Again, this sub-population might be unrepresentative of migration behaviors for younger households who may be more tied to place by employment or children.

The effect of government transfer payments (particularly relevant to the current study) on migration is more mixed. (Alm and Enami, 2017b) finds that the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform, which provided more generous in-kind benefits to low-income households, enhanced migration into the state, but only for destinations nearest the border. Similar effects are found for cash benefits. McKinnish (2007b) find only short distance moves are influenced by the generosity of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. Fiva (2009) consistently finds that only short distance moves are affected by benefit generosity in Norway.

Most directly related to our own research, Kennan and Walker (2010) directly compares migration elasticities of wages and public assistance, using the sub-sample of unskilled women with dependant children from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They find large migratory wage effects, but limited welfare induced migration, despite large observed differences between states in benefit generosity.

In summary, few existing papers compare different forms of financial benefits head-to-head, yet such trade-offs between tax and benefit levels are at the core of public finance. While existing work provides evidence for the importance of wages and price levels in migration decisions, work on the effect of taxes or public assistance has been limited to particular income or age groups.

3 Methods

We designed a survey experiment to elicit individual preferences for cash transfers relative to other forms of financial gain. While combined into one instrument, we estimate relative preferences using three different experiments, each offering unique insights. In the first experiment, subjects are asked to indicate their preference for a cash transfer relative to an equally-sized tax cut using three different frames of who is receiving the hypothetical benefits. Here, treatments vary only the framing around the cash transfer. Subjects are then assigned to one of two sub treatments and asked if they would prefer an increase in public spending or a i) tax cut or ii) cash transfer. This first experiment focuses on preferences within a respondent's current state of residence. In the second experiment, subjects are specifically asked about their hypothetical probability of moving to a different state that offers a financial reward (e.g., a cash transfer, tax cut, reduction in cost of living, or a wage increase). In the third experiment, subjects are provided with factual information about the state of Alaska (including, in one treatment, information regarding Alaska's universal cash-transfer program) and then asked about their probability of moving to the state. We pre-registered our survey and analysis plan with the American Economic Association enumerating the heterogeneity dimensions that we would explore.[4] Deviations from our pre-registered plan are noted in the text.

We examine heterogeneity in each experiment to understand whether differences between respondents arise from different underlying tangible incentives (i.e., a given benefit offers a larger nominal value based on individual characteristics) versus different intangible preferences and ideologies (i.e., differences in *perceived* benefits based on biases, perceptions, ideologies, or beliefs). For example, the net present value of a perpetual $2,000 cash transfer exceeds that of a $2,000 wage increase for someone at or near retirement age or who is not employed. Conversely, some respondents may prefer tax cuts to cash transfers as they align with their own cultural or political values.

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[4]The AEA RCT registration number is AEARCTR-0011919.

These considerations provide the foundation of our heterogeneous analysis. In particular, we expect to find stronger (weaker) preferences for cash transfers and cost of living reductions (tax cuts and wage increases) among people at, or approaching retirement age or otherwise outside of the labor market. Because conservatives tend to favor small government and individual autonomy, we expect to find that conservative respondents favor tax cuts to cash transfers. Further, we expect some political polarization around the cost of living, given the date our instrument was in the field (October, 2023) and the political discourse about inflation at the time. Specifically, we expect conservative respondents to be more sensitive to cost of living than liberals given political reporting (Forbes, 2023) and as reflected in opinion polling. In fact, a Pew Research Center Poll conducted in May of 2024, found that, whereas 80% of registered Republicans viewed inflation as a "very big problem," just 46% of registered Democrats viewed inflation as such (Doherty and Gómez, 2024).[5]

The survey was constructed using Qualtrics and subjects were recruited on Prolific.[6] Within the survey, subjects were required to answer each question before moving on and could not go back and change their answers to previous questions. Subjects were required to be U.S. residents and at least eighteen years old. The survey instrument is provided in Appendix B.

We sampled 4,500 United States-based Prolific users from 10/30/2023 - 10/31/2023. Subjects were paid $1.00 to complete what was advertised to be a five-minute survey. Before exposure to treatments, all users were asked to provide demographic information including age, political preferences, household income, employment status, current state, and current ZIP code.[7]

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[5]Importantly, subsetting the data by gender, political ideology, age, household income, and employment status was pre-planned and our methods were pre-registered at the American Economic Association. The AEA RCT registration number is AEARCTR-0011919.

[6]Among the leading online survey panels, Prolific has been shown to provide the samples with the highest rates of attention, honesty, and comprehension (Eyal et al., 2021).

[7]Table A1 in Appendix A provides mean values of observed subject characteristics across treatments in the three experiments which are described in detail in the following sections.

4 Experiment 1: Relative Preferences for Cash

In Experiment 1, we elicit people's relative preference for cash transfers (in their current state of residence). To do this, we frame the opportunity cost of cash transfers in two different ways. First, we ask people if they prefer cash transfers to tax cuts:

Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving you $2,000 per year)
or issuing a cash payment (worth $2,000 per year to you). Which would you prefer?

Respondents indicated their preference using an eleven-point Likert scale in which 0 indicated a strong preference for tax cuts and 10 indicated a strong preference for cash transfers. The elicitation question above clearly frames the cost of a $2,000 cash transfer as an equivalently-sized tax cut. However, from this framing, it is unclear whether the cash transfer or tax cut would be a private benefit and apply only to the respondent, people similar to the respondent, or everyone. We therefore assign subjects to one of three elicitation questions that vary the framing from "saving you $2,000 per year" to "saving people like you $2,000 per year", and "saving everyone $2,000 per year". The "like you" and "everyone" language primes subjects to think about other residents of their state that may also be recipients of the financial benefit. As shown by DeSante (2013) and Winter (2006), public opinion about benefit programs depends on a respondent's ideology, their views about who is "deserving," and in-group versus out-group attitudes (particularly on racial dimensions). Subjects who have strong other-regarding preferences may prefer the cash transfer relative to the tax cut in the "everyone" frame. On the other hand, subjects who have strong self- or in-group preferences and dislike benefits which are unconditional on work might prefer cash transfers when framed as an in-group benefit versus a universal benefit. The baseline results are provided below in Figure 1.

Panel (a) gives the results by elicitation question, pooling across observed respondent heterogeneity. We observe similar aggregate responses regardless of whether the cash transfer

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Figure 1: Relative Preferences for Cash

(a) By Elicitation Question

(b) By Group

Notes: Panel (a) provides mean responses to the three separate questions "Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving "you"/"people like you"/"everyone" \$2,000 per year) or issuing a cash payment (worth \$2,000 per year to "you"/"people like you"/"everyone"). Which would you prefer?" Each of the three responses are measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Strongly prefer tax cut) to 10 (Strongly prefer cash). Panel (b) pools the three elicitation questions and reports mean responses by group. "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 or 7 (1 or 2) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than \$40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than \$70,000. "Young" ("Mature") respondents are younger than 40 (40 or older). "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work).

or tax cut were framed as benefits to "you", "people like you", or "everyone". We also see that, across these elicitation questions, people exhibit a strong relative preference for cash transfers; responses range from 6.48 (when the cash transfer is for "people like you") to 6.58 (when the cash transfer is for "you").

Having established that stated preferences are largely insensitive to the specific framing of the elicitation question, panel (b) pools across the three frames and subsets on observed respondent heterogeneity. Three key results emerge. First, people who identify as liberal (conservative)[8] exhibit stronger (weaker) preferences for cash transfers relative to tax cuts. Surprisingly, conservative respondents favored cash transfers to tax cuts, although the mean response among this group (5.35) is not statistically different from the mid-point "neutral"

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[8]Subjects were asked "People often describe themselves as being on a spectrum of the political left (liberal) or political right (conservative). How would you describe yourself? Liberal respondents are those who answered "0" and conservative respondents are those who answered "6".

response of 5 (p=0.21). Second, we find that "poor" respondents[9] exhibit stronger prefer-ences for cash transfers (mean response = 7.42) than the "rich" (mean response = 5.75), although both groups prefer cash transfers to tax cuts (p=0.000). Third, respondents who are employed full time exhibit weaker preferences for cash than those respondents who are not employed and not looking (i.e., outside the labor market).

While tax cuts are one potential opportunity cost of a cash transfer, so could be spending on public programs. We explore whether preferences for cash transfers depend on the perceived opportunity cost by framing the cost of a cash transfer as a reduction in government spending on education and healthcare (typically the two largest categories of expenditures at the state and local level). For completeness, we also measure respondent preferences for tax cuts relative to additional government spending. To this end, after describing their preferences for cash transfers relative to tax cuts (the results of which were just described above), subjects are randomly assigned to answer one of two additional questions. The first question asks respondents if they prefer cash transfers to additional government spending:

Imagine your state was deciding between issuing a cash payment to people like you (worth $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?

The second question asks respondents if they prefer tax cuts to additional government spending:

Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes for people like you (saving you $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?

For both of these elicitation questions, respondents provided answers using an eleven-

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[9]Subjects were asked to report their household income. We define "poor" ("rich") respondents as those with a household income less than $40,000 and "rich" as those with a household income greater than $70,000.

point Likert scale in which 0 indicated a strong preference for tax cuts or cash transfers (depending on treatment assignment), and 10 indicated a strong preference for enhanced government spending. These results are provided in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: Relative Preferences for Spending

(a) Relative Preference for Spending

(b) Tax Cuts vs Spending: By Group

(c) Cash Transfer vs Spending: By Group

**Notes:** Panel (a) provides the mean responses to the questions "Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes for people like you (saving you $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care." and "Imagine your state was deciding between issuing a cash payment to people like you (worth $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?" Both responses are measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Strongly prefer tax cut or cash) to 10 (Strongly prefer spending). Panels (b) and (c) provide relative preferences by group. "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 (0) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than $40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than $70,000. "Mature" respondents are at least sixty-five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work).

Panel (a) pools responses across subjects. Respondents assigned to the "Tax Cut vs

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Spending" treatment were, on average, indifferent between the two policies (the average of 4.93 is statistically indifferent from 5, $p=0.384$). However, people in the "Cash vs Spending" treatment had a clear preference for the cash transfer (the mean response is 4.2 and is statistically different from 5, $p=0.000$).

In panels (b) and (c), we subset the data along a variety of respondent characteristics to further explore heterogeneous preferences for cash transfers. People who identify as liberal strongly prefer government spending to tax cuts (panel b), and slightly prefer spending to cash transfers (panel c), in which the mean response (5.4) is statistically different from 5 ($p=0.049$). Conservatives, on the other hand, strongly prefer both tax cuts and cash transfers to additional government spending. From panel (b), the poor have a slight preference for spending over tax cuts, and the rich have a slight preference for cash transfers over additional spending (panel c). Importantly, though, all types of respondents prefer cash transfers over additional government spending except for liberals and people who are not employed.

We further assess relative preferences for cash transfers by regressing responses on subject characteristics including indicators for being liberal (indicated by answering "0" on a 7-point Likert scale), conservative (indicated by answering "7" on the same 7-point Likert scale), mature (over the age of sixty five) poor (having a household income less than $40,000), rich (having a household income greater than $70,000), and employment status. These results are provided in Table 1 below. The reference group are not mature (under the age of sixty five), middle income, political moderates, who are employed part time. While conditioning on observed respondent heterogeneity is useful for controlling for omitted variable bias, it is not a panacea for bias and so we do not interpret the coefficients reported in Table 1 as causal.

The outcome variable in column 1 is respondent stated preference for a $2,000 cash transfer relative to an equal-sized tax cut (measured on an 11-point Likert scale). The outcome variables in columns 2 and 3 are respondent stated preferences for spending relative to an equal-sized tax cut or cash transfer, respectively. Relative to the comparison group,

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liberal respondents are more likely to favor cash transfers to tax cuts. However, they also have stronger relative preferences for government spending over both tax cuts and cash transfers (columns 2 and 3). Conservative respondents tend to have opposite preferences. Importantly, though, from column 1, conservatives still favor cash transfers to tax cuts (6.693-1.05 = 5.6, which is greater than 5 (p=0.000)). Relative to middle-income respondents (with a household income between \$40,000 and \$70,000), "poor" respondents have stronger preferences for cash transfers relative to both tax cuts and spending (columns 1 and 3), and are indifferent between tax cuts and spending (column 2). Conversely, relative to middle-income respondents, "rich" respondents have stronger preferences for tax cuts over cash transfers (column 1), and stronger preferences for spending over cash transfers (column 3). However, this group still ultimately favors cash transfers to tax cuts (6.693-1.112 = 5.581, which is greater than 5 (p =0.000)) and spending (4.065+.579 = 4.64 is less than 5 (p=0.000)).

To review this section, we have uncovered the following artifacts. First, cash transfers are, on average, quite popular. While this is true across broad groups of people—the rich and poor, employed and not employed, liberal and conservative—there is significant heterogeneity in the magnitude of people's preferences for cash. Second, when the opportunity cost of cash transfer is framed as a tax cut, preferences for cash are highest among liberal, poor, and mature (at least 65 years old) respondents. When the opportunity cost is framed as additional spending, preferences for cash are highest among conservative respondents.

5 Experiment 2: Hypothetical Migration Vignettes

Experiment 1 elicited relative preferences for cash transfers with no reference to migration. Experiment 2 is designed to better understand peoples preferences for—and in particular people's willingness to move in order to receive—cash transfers. Interstate migration has fixed pecuniary "box and truck" costs, but also high non-pecuniary psychic

Table 1: Relative Preferences for Cash

	Cash vs Tax	Spend vs Tax	Spend vs Cash
	Coef	Coef	Coef
	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)	(Std. Err.)
Liberal	1.124***	2.759***	1.416***
	(0.126)	(0.178)	(0.204)
Conservative	-1.050***	-2.242***	-2.166***
	(0.283)	(0.325)	(0.279)
Mature	0.585***	-0.282	-0.258
	(0.207)	(0.274)	(0.299)
Poor	0.433***	0.233	-0.385*
	(0.139)	(0.204)	(0.207)
Rich	-1.112***	0.120	0.579***
	(0.129)	(0.181)	(0.185)
Employed	-0.0258	-0.287*	-0.193
	(0.119)	(0.163)	(0.174)
No Employed	0.205	-0.0949	-0.196
	(0.176)	(0.254)	(0.250)
Constant	6.693***	4.590***	4.065***
	(0.130)	(0.185)	(0.192)
R^2	0.0683	0.129	0.0647
N	4215	2095	2120

Notes: The outcome variable in column 1 is the (pooled) response to the question "Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving "you"/"people like you"/"everyone" $2,000 per year) or issuing a cash payment (worth $2,000 per year to "you"/"people like you"/"everyone"). The outcome variables in columns 2 and 3 are the responses to the questions "Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes/issuing a cash payment for people like you (saving you $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?", respectively. All three outcomes are measured on an 11 point Likert scale (0-10), where 10 indicates a relative preferences for cash in the first columns, and a relative preference for spending in columns 2 and 3. $***, **, *$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

costs. In Experiment 2, we test the migratory magnetism of four prima facie equivalent benefits: annual cash transfers, annual wage increases, tax cuts, and cost-of-living reductions. To evaluate respondent willingness to move in response to one of these four hypothetical structural changes, we first elicit which state a respondent is most likely to move to, if they were to move at some point over the next 1-3 years.[10] By framing the experiment in terms

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[10]Specifically, following experiment 1, we asked all respondents "If you were to move away from the state you currently live in, what is your most likely destination? (Choose one state [From a list of 50])."

of a state of their choice, we maximize the baseline probability of migration. Subjects were then randomized into either the control condition or one of the four treatment conditions outlined below:

Experiment 2: Control

Thinking about the next three years, how likely are you to move to [state most likely to move to], where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

Experiment 2: Treatment Cash Transfer

Imagine [state most likely to move to] implements a program that would pay every resident (regardless of age or employment status) $2,000 per year. Because every person in your household is eligible to receive the payments, that would be a total of [$2000 × # of people in your household] per year.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to [state most likely to move to], where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

Experiment 2: Treatment Cost of Living

Imagine [state most likely to move to] experienced a reduction in its current cost of living (saving households $2,000 per person). For your household, the reduced cost of living would total [$2,000 × # of people in your household] per year.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to [state most likely to move to], where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

Experiment 2: Treatment Wages

Imagine [state most likely to move to] experienced a [$2,000× # of people in your household] per year increase in wages for jobs that might interest you.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to [state most likely to move to], where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

Experiment 2: Treatment Tax Cut

Imagine [state most likely to move to] implements a tax cut based on household size ($2,000 per person regardless of age or employment status). For your household the tax cut would total [$2,000× # of people in your household] per year.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to [state most likely to move to], where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

Respondents indicated their hypothetical willingness to move using an open-ended text box, and their answers could range from 0 to 100. On the following page, respondents were asked, "Thinking about the hypothetical scenario described in the previous question, how satisfied would you be with your life if you were to move to [state most likely to move to]?" and subjects then indicated their expectation using an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Not at all satisfied) to 10 (Very satisfied).[11]

Unconditional answers to both questions are provided Figures 3 and 4, below. Confidence intervals are computed by linearly regressing responses on the four treatment indicators and

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[11]Ex ante, we were concerned about our ability to detect relative differences between treatments. If baseline (control) migration probabilities were near zero, and treatment effects were small, these differences could be masked due to rounding and censoring at a zero lower bound. Asking respondents to describe their expected satisfaction conditional on migration, offered (possibly) a more statistically powerful way to test relative preferences for these financial benefits.

suppressing the constant term. To be clear, in these figures, we are simply reporting mean responses across groups and treatments. Starting with people's stated willingness to move (Figure 3), we see that subjects, on average, state they are more likely to move to receive a cash transfer than an equal-sized tax cut.[12] However, on average, people respond similarly to receiving information about cash transfers, wage increases, and reductions in the cost of living.

We again document meaningful heterogeneity across the subject pool in Figure 3. For example, across the four treatments, conservatives tend to state they are more likely to move than other people. The opposite tends to be true among mature and not employed people. Consistent with our prior beliefs, people who are not employed, liberal, or poor, stated higher probabilities of moving if they were exposed to the cash-transfer treatment rather than the tax-cut treatment.

Table 2 provides conditional treatment effects on people's stated willingness to move. Column one pools across all subjects, the other columns provide results after subsetting on different groups.

Pooling respondents (column 1), exposure to any one of the treatments significantly increased the stated likelihood of moving. Exposure to the cash-transfer treatment more than doubled responses relative to the control group (from 23.01 to 44.63). Treatment effects were similar across the cash transfer, cost of living, and wage treatments, and markedly lower in the tax-cut treatment. Somewhat surprisingly, exposure to the cash-transfer treatment had the largest impact on people's stated willingness to move at both ends of the political spectrum (34.23 for conservatives, and 29.00 for liberals). We also document stronger effects among the poor (26.17), and those not employed and not looking (28.85). As anticipated,

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[12]Note that these four informational treatments are very similar in terms of the monetary reward associated with moving. For employed individuals, a tax cut and equally-sized reduction in the cost of living have identical effects on a person's disposable income. However, we did not specify whether taxes would need to be paid on the cash transfer to simplify question wording. Whereas a state-administered cash transfer would reasonably be tax exempt, it could still be subject to a federal income tax. Similarly, we did not explicitly specify whether additional wage income would be subject to state and federal income taxes. Therefore, one may expect people to respond more strongly to tax cuts and reductions in the cost of living relative to cash transfers and wage increases.

Figure 3: Willingness to Move to Another State

(a) By Elicitation Question

Notes: The outcome variable is respondent stated likelihood of moving to another state in the next 3 years measured on a 100-point Likert scale. "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 (0) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than $40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than $70,000. "Mature" respondents are at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work). 95% confidence intervals are provided.

the tax-cut treatment effect was small among mature respondents (who are of retirement age). We document minimal heterogeneity in the effect of exposure to the cost-of-living treatment (with the exception of conservatives who, again, responded relatively strongly to this informational treatment). Finally, there was homogeneity in the response to exposure to the wage treatment. Importantly, across all subsets (with the exception of conservative and mature respondents), people in the cash-transfer treatment said they were (statistically) more likely to move than people in the tax-cut treatment.

Turning to Figure 4, within-group predictions of life satisfaction were more similar across treatments. Similar to the willingness-to-move estimates reported above, expected life satisfaction tends to be higher among conservative and mature people. Conversely, poor respondents tend to have lower expected life satisfaction across treatments. People who are not employed tended to state higher levels of predicted satisfaction if they were exposed to the

Table 2: Willingness to Move to Another State

	All	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
Cash Transfer	21.62***	34.23***	29.00***	19.77***	18.08***	26.17***	20.37***	28.85***
	(1.535)	(6.576)	(3.608)	(5.098)	(2.234)	(2.958)	(2.034)	(4.005)
Tax Cut	15.61***	27.43***	17.53***	12.59**	11.75***	19.68***	15.83***	14.79***
	(1.436)	(7.155)	(3.290)	(5.005)	(2.107)	(2.645)	(1.964)	(3.698)
COL	21.47***	34.40***	18.52***	21.74***	17.23***	23.90***	20.78***	24.60***
	(1.464)	(6.100)	(3.394)	(4.622)	(2.199)	(2.675)	(2.011)	(3.579)
Wages	22.71***	26.03***	21.63***	17.55***	20.20***	24.99***	22.95***	21.43***
	(1.505)	(6.161)	(3.496)	(5.180)	(2.198)	(2.863)	(2.049)	(3.997)
Constant	23.01***	14.29**	22.05***	14.02***	24.38***	18.59***	27.11***	16.72***
	(1.532)	(6.373)	(3.519)	(4.800)	(2.051)	(2.077)	(1.839)	(3.249)
Cash-TaxCut	6.004***	6.806	11.47***	7.184	6.336***	6.482**	4.533**	14.06***
	1.572	8.076	3.728	5.742	2.239	3.119	2.063	4.571
Cash-COL	0.144	-0.173	10.48***	-1.970	0.854	2.269	-0.416	4.254
	1.600	7.240	3.836	5.348	2.326	3.143	2.106	4.486
Cash-Wages	-1.091	8.206	7.373*	2.222	-2.119	1.176	-2.583	7.419
	1.635	7.174	3.910	5.732	2.328	3.293	2.143	4.783
R^2	0.0843	0.141	0.0945	0.120	0.0637	0.106	0.0826	0.133
N	4215	242	830	324	1903	1213	2306	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is a person's stated likelihood of moving to another state in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) "Cons" ("Lib") is unity for conservatives (liberals). "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). "COL" indicates the cost-of-living treatment. Treatment indicates a respondent was exposed to any of the four treatments. Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***, **, *$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

cash-transfer treatment rather than any of the other three treatments.

Table 3 provides conditional estimated treatment effects on people's stated expected life satisfaction. Pooling across subjects (column 1), we find that exposure to any one of the four treatments increased respondent expected life satisfaction by similar magnitudes. For example, relative to those in the control group, expected satisfaction was $0.34/7.7 = 4.4\%$ higher in the cash-transfer treatment ($p = 0.001$). For reference, the tax cut, cost of living, and wage treatments increased responses by 3.0%, 4.4%, and 3.4%, respectively. Interestingly, none of the treatments had any effect on expected life satisfaction among conservatives or the rich, and yet, among these people, exposure to treatment did increase their stated likelihood of moving. Liberals responded more strongly to the treatments (except the wage treatment). Relative to those employed full time, respondents who were not employed and not looking also state higher hypothetical life-satisfaction from living in states with cash transfers ($p=0.010$), lower cost of living ($p=0.062$), and higher wages ($p = 0.052$).

Note that the monetary value of each treatment is scaled by household size. For example,

Figure 4: Satisfaction of living in Another State

(b) By Group

Notes: The outcome variable is a respondent expected life satisfaction of living in another state, measured on an 11-point Likert scale. "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 or 7 (1 or 2) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than $40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than $70,000. "Young" ("Mature") respondents are younger than 40 (40 or older). "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work). 95% confidence intervals are provided.

the value of the cash transfer is $2,000×house hold size. In (online) Appendix A we estimate treatment effects by household size (see Table A2). We find that, regardless of treatment assignment, increasing family size is associated with (qualitatively) enhanced treatment effects. This effect is especially large in the cash-transfer treatment in which a unit increase in household size increases the cash-transfer treatment effect on the stated probability of moving by 1.7 percentage points (a 10% increase). We also explore additional sources of heterogeneity by location—rather than respondent—characteristics. These additional outcomes are potentially relevant from a political economy and policy perspective, but we lack strong prior beliefs about the relative magnitudes of these heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, we estimate effects among people from oil-rich states[13] recognizing that these states tend to have low broad-based tax rates due to reliance on resource-based tax revenue

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[13]We define "oil rich" as unity for respondents living in the top ten most oil-dependent states according to James and Rivera (2022).

(James, 2015) which could influence people's responses to, say, the tax-cut treatment. We also explore heterogeneities based on the overall tax climate a respondent is exposed to[14], and whether the respondent lives in an urban zip code.[15] These additional results are provided in online Appendix A (see Table A4). Across these three characteristics—Oil Rich, Low Tax, Urban Zip—we document similar treatment effects on respondent's stated likelihood of moving as the full, pooled sample.

Table 3: Expected Satisfaction of Moving to Another State

	All	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
Cash Transfer	0.340***	-0.0210	0.733***	0.305	0.197	0.320	0.293**	0.791***
	(0.0993)	(0.446)	(0.249)	(0.388)	(0.144)	(0.199)	(0.134)	(0.305)
Tax Cut	0.232**	-0.296	0.538**	0.402	0.0685	0.267	0.327**	0.301
	(0.0990)	(0.479)	(0.232)	(0.395)	(0.140)	(0.195)	(0.133)	(0.323)
COL	0.343***	0.107	0.492**	-0.0231	0.0652	0.458**	0.317**	0.551*
	(0.0991)	(0.426)	(0.239)	(0.407)	(0.149)	(0.188)	(0.135)	(0.295)
Wages	0.266***	0.138	0.151	0.445	0.114	0.336*	0.308**	0.603*
	(0.0989)	(0.405)	(0.243)	(0.381)	(0.144)	(0.194)	(0.134)	(0.310)
Constant	7.743***	8.312***	7.745***	8.060***	7.841***	7.489***	8.017***	7.824***
	(0.101)	(0.443)	(0.245)	(0.360)	(0.125)	(0.162)	(0.121)	(0.277)
Cash-Tax	0.108	0.275	0.195	-0.0970	0.128	0.0528	-0.0340	0.490
	0.0950	0.487	0.222	0.348	0.134	0.190	0.125	0.305
Cash-COL	-0.00275	-0.128	0.241	0.328	0.131	-0.139	-0.0232	0.240
	0.0950	0.426	0.230	0.345	0.143	0.183	0.128	0.274
Cash-Wages	0.0739	-0.159	0.583**	-0.141	0.0831	-0.0162	-0.0151	0.188
	0.0950	0.405	0.234	0.329	0.139	0.189	0.126	0.286
R^2	0.0168	0.0186	0.0231	0.0247	0.00843	0.0208	0.0189	0.0425
N	4215	242	830	324	1903	1213	2306	521

Notes: The outcome variable is a person's stated satisfaction of living in another state, measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (low level of satisfaction) to 10 (high level of satisfaction). "Cons" ("Lib") is unity for conservatives (liberals). "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). "COL" indicates the cost-of-living treatment. Treatment indicates a respondent was exposed to any of the four treatments. Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

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[14]We define "Low Tax" respondents as those living in one of the ten states with the Tax Foundation's "Best 2024 State Business Tax Climate Index".

[15]Following (Bartik et al., 2023), we define respondents as living in an "Urban Zip" if they live in a zip code where 100% of the population is defined as living in an urban area.

6 Experiment 3: Real-world information provision

The third experiment takes a more grounded approach to estimating the relative effect of cash transfers on people's willingness to move. We leverage Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) Check program to provide respondents with a real-world cash transfer scenario. Specifically, following experiments one and two, subjects are told, "Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there." This language is intentionally vague so that subjects were not aware that *every* subject was exposed to information about Alaska. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four informational treatments with real information about Alaska, one of which includes information about the PFD.

As described by Haaland et al. (2023), subjects in information-treatment experiments will have a distribution of priors before receiving treatment. In our case, these prior beliefs relate to fiscal policy in Alaska and its PFD Program. In order to gauge respondents priors on Alaska, after each information treatment, we asked subjects if the information they received was previously known and, if not, if their prior was more or less favorable. Based on these questions, we find most subjects had limited prior knowledge of Alaska's geography, economy, PFD program, and fiscal policy.

To account for the fact that, simply reminding people about Alaska could influence their stated preference for living there (or induce experimenter demand bias), the control group provided innocuous information about Alaska:

Experiment 3: Control

> *"Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not."*

Subjects in each of the four informational treatments were provided with the same innocuous information in addition to the following:

Experiment 3: Treatment Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) Program

Every Alaskan resident, regardless of age, is eligible to receive a Permanent Fund Dividend Check (PFD). Its value varies from year to year, but is typically between $1,000 and $3,000. So, a household of your size would receive between [subject household size × 1000] and [subject household size × 3000] each year.

Experiment 3: Treatment Alaskan Taxes

Alaska is the only state without a broad-based tax. While Alaskans pay local taxes, they do not pay any state income, sales, or property tax.

Experiment 3: Treatment Urbanization of Anchorage

Alaska's largest city is Anchorage and is home to roughly 300,000 people. For reference, it's larger than Boise Idaho, Reno Nevada, and Greensboro North Carolina. The city is home to dozens of breweries, award-winning restaurants, and major retailers like Target, Costco, and Home Depot.

Experiment 3: Treatment Alaska's Fiscal Situation

Recently, the State of Alaska has experienced large budget deficits, leading to significant cuts to education, public health, and infrastructure spending. It's a habitual problem in the state resulting from its dependence on oil which creates repeating "boom and bust" cycles in the economy.

6.1   Stated Responses

Following exposure to one of the four treatments (or the control), subjects were asked "Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in

the next three years?" and indicated their response using an open text box. Subjects were also asked "How satisfied with your life do you think you would be if you were to move to Alaska?" and indicated their response using an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Not at all satisfied) to 10 (Very satisfied).

Figure 5 gives people's stated likelihood of moving to Alaska in the next three years by treatment and subject characteristics. People in the PFD Info and Tax Info treatments gave similar responses (both groups said there was roughly a 10% chance of moving). Somewhat surprisingly, average responses were lower among the urbanization treatment, perhaps because people who would consider moving to Alaska have relative preferences for rural living. Less surprising is that people in the fiscal treatment gave markedly lower responses (among this group, the average response was less than 5%). While conservatives stated relatively high probabilities of moving to Alaska across all four treatments, the probability was highest among those in the PFD Info treatment. Surprisingly, conservatives do not appear to be bothered by fiscal volatility; they stated similar probabilities of moving across the Tax Info, Urban Info, and Fiscal Info treatments. Liberals and the poor, on the other hand, state lower probabilities of moving when assigned to the Fiscal Info treatment relative to any of the other treatments.

These initial results are echoed in Figure 6 which gives people's expected life satisfaction from living in Alaska. Here we find similar responses across the PFD Info, Tax Info, and Urban Info treatments. Responses were markedly lower among people in the fiscal treatment (for every group except conservatives). Within the fiscal treatment, there is again interesting heterogeneity in responses. For example, conservatives said their expected life satisfaction was roughly 4.5/10, whereas liberals and the poor expected their satisfaction to be closer to 3.5/10. Comparing responses in the PFD Info treatment to those in the Tax Info treatment, people tend to state larger probabilities of moving to Alaska when assigned to the PFD info Treatment rather than the Tax Info treatment. Taken together, these results point to two interesting results. First, people do state higher probabilities of moving to Alaska after

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learning about Alaska's cash transfer program. Second, there appears to be heterogeneity in preferences regarding fiscal uncertainty and volatility across the political spectrum. This offers an interesting implication of fossil-fuel dependence (which often creates fiscal volatility): heterogeneous migration and sorting. One contributing factor for why so many fossil-fuel-rich states (e.g., Texas, Wyoming, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Alaska) tend to be so conservative is that liberals tend to have stronger preferences for fiscal stability.

Figure 5: Willingness to Move to Alaska

(a) By Elicitation Question

Notes: The outcome variable is a person's stated likeliness to move to Alaska in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 or 7 (1 or 2) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than $40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than $70,000. "Mature" respondents are at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work). 95% confidence intervals are provided.

We estimate conditional treatment effects by regressing people's stated willingness to move to Alaska, and their stated expected life satisfaction of moving to Alaska, on indicators for treatment assignment (including the control condition) and condition on indicators for liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. Treatment effects on

Figure 6: Satisfaction of Moving to Alaska

(b) By Group

Notes: The outcome variable is a person's stated satisfaction of living in Alaska, measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (low level of satisfaction) to 10 (high level of satisfaction). "Conservatives" ("Liberals") reported to be a 6 or 7 (1 or 2) on a 7-point Likert scale measuring political ideology. "Poor" respondents are those with an income less than $40,000 and "Rich" respondents are those with a household income greater than $70,000. "Mature" respondents are at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") are employed full time (not working and not looking for work). 95% confidence intervals are provided.

people's stated willingness to move to Alaska are provided in Table 4 below. Conditional on observed heterogeneity, subjects in the control treatment said the likelihood of moving to Alaska in the next 3 years was roughly 5.4%. This number roughly doubles among people in either the PFD or tax treatments. Exposure to the fiscal treatment decreased the pooled response by 1.2 points (or 22%).

Sub-setting the data by respondent characteristics reveals that the effect of exposure to the PFD treatment was especially large among poor, fully employed, and politically conservative respondents. Among conservatives, exposure to the PFD treatment increased the stated likelihood of moving by 14.41% points. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that exposure to the PFD treatment had a different effect than exposure to the tax treatment for

all groups other than conservatives. We do, however, fairly consistently find that exposure to the PFD treatment increased the stated willingness to move to Alaska compared to those in both the urbanization treatment, and (unsurprisingly), the fiscal treatment.

Table 4: Willingness to Move to Alaska

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	4.930***	14.41***	3.829**	3.994	4.004***	6.581***	6.939***	2.598
	(0.831)	(4.608)	(1.804)	(2.750)	(1.198)	(1.575)	(1.208)	(1.625)
Tax Info	4.005***	4.831	3.554*	0.625	2.765**	6.196***	5.199***	2.000
	(0.829)	(3.525)	(1.928)	(2.023)	(1.132)	(1.722)	(1.159)	(1.533)
Urban Info	0.959	5.358	1.076	1.613	0.938	2.160	1.607	1.596
	(0.734)	(3.825)	(1.790)	(2.282)	(1.067)	(1.407)	(0.999)	(1.916)
Fiscal Info	-1.261**	6.847**	-2.762**	-0.0115	-1.538*	-1.016	-0.390	-0.736
	(0.638)	(3.266)	(1.381)	(2.059)	(0.927)	(1.091)	(0.910)	(1.197)
Constant	5.456***	-3.887	5.634***	3.279	5.027***	5.030***	6.068***	2.965**
	(0.821)	(3.627)	(1.913)	(2.309)	(1.014)	(1.068)	(0.995)	(1.444)
PFD-Tax Info	0.925	9.579*	0.275	3.369	1.239	0.385	1.740	0.598
	0.955	5.338	2.158	2.726	1.323	2.035	1.394	1.956
PFD-Urban Info	3.971***	9.051	2.753	2.381	3.066**	4.421**	5.333***	1.002
	0.874	5.646	1.986	2.915	1.259	1.785	1.260	2.188
PFD-Fiscal Info	6.190***	7.563	6.592***	4.005	5.542***	7.597***	7.329***	3.334**
	0.797	5.047	1.642	2.858	1.152	1.543	1.189	1.655
R^2	0.0290	0.0744	0.0311	0.0226	0.0280	0.0345	0.0351	0.0327
N	4208	241	830	324	1900	1211	2302	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is a person's stated likelihood of moving to Alaska in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) "Cons" ("Lib") is unity for conservatives (liberals). "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table 5 gives the conditional estimated effects of treatment assignment on people's expected life satisfaction of living in Alaska. As with previous conditional estimates, effects are estimated by regressing people's stated life satisfaction of living in Alaska on treatment indicators where respondents in the control make up the reference group. Pooling across respondents, we find that both the PFD and tax treatments increase mean responses (by similar magnitudes to the cash transfer and tax-cut treatments in Experiment 2), and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that these two treatment effects are identical. Interestingly, the pooled effect of exposure to the fiscal treatment was greater in magnitude than that of the PFD treatment (-0.488 vs 0.324), though the magnitudes of these effects are not statistically

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different from each other (p=0.43).

As with Experiment 2, in online Appendix A, we explore these Alaska-specific treatment effects by household size (see Table A3). We document larger effects of the PFD treatment among people with larger household size. Specifically, the effect of exposure to the PFD treatment increases by 0.952 for each person in a household. This means that, for a person living alone, exposure to the PFD treatment increases the stated likelihood of moving to Alaska by 3.2 percentage points. For a person with a family size of five, this effect increases to 7 percentage points. Unlike Experiment 2, only the PFD cash-transfer treatment varies by household size.

We also tested origin-location heterogeniety in Appendix Table A5, and observe similar effects to our pooled estimates. In other words, we do not find differences from the entire sample in willingness to move or life satisfaction for respondents in oil rich states when considering the Fiscal Information treatment, we do not find differences for respondents in low tax states when they are exposed to the Alaska Tax Information treatment, and we do not find differences for respondents in urban zip codes when exposed to the Urban Information treatment.

To recap our main findings from this subsection, we uncover the following artifacts. First, relative to those in the control group, respondents exposed to the PFD treatment say they are nearly twice as likely to move to Alaska in the next 3 years (5% vs 10%). Effect sizes are largest among conservatives, the poor, full-time employed, and people with large households. People exposed to information about fiscal uncertainty and dependence on oil state lower likelihoods of moving (except for conservative respondents). We conclude that the fiscal structure of Alaska, both the PFD and budgetary uncertainty and shortfalls make Alaska uniquely attractive to conservative respondents.

Table 5: Expected Satisfaction of Living in Alaska

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.324***	0.720	0.302	-0.179	0.122	0.662***	0.405**	0.322
	(0.121)	(0.585)	(0.271)	(0.517)	(0.175)	(0.236)	(0.168)	(0.335)
Tax Info	0.263**	-0.428	-0.115	-0.559	0.160	0.265	0.267	0.439
	(0.125)	(0.567)	(0.285)	(0.499)	(0.184)	(0.232)	(0.168)	(0.368)
Urban Info	0.179	0.203	0.117	0.360	0.0738	0.281	0.249	0.262
	(0.123)	(0.535)	(0.302)	(0.538)	(0.178)	(0.235)	(0.163)	(0.375)
Fiscal Info	-0.488***	0.493	-0.993***	-1.071**	-0.548***	-0.596***	-0.454***	-0.540
	(0.119)	(0.542)	(0.260)	(0.487)	(0.179)	(0.216)	(0.162)	(0.357)
Constant	4.584***	4.385***	4.340***	4.407***	4.830***	4.396***	4.753***	4.625***
	(0.115)	(0.520)	(0.248)	(0.521)	(0.180)	(0.216)	(0.175)	(0.373)
PFD-Tax Info	0.0614	1.149*	0.416	0.380	-0.0379	0.397	0.138	-0.117
	0.124	0.622	0.276	0.468	0.178	0.247	0.168	0.347
PFD-Urban Info	0.145	0.518	0.184	-0.539	0.0481	0.381	0.156	0.0606
	0.123	0.601	0.293	0.506	0.172	0.251	0.163	0.353
PFD-Fiscal Info	0.812***	0.227	1.295***	0.892*	0.670***	1.258***	0.859***	0.862***
	0.118	0.583	0.251	0.461	0.173	0.231	0.161	0.334
R^2	0.0274	0.0457	0.0358	0.0392	0.0368	0.0311	0.0363	0.0436
N	4208	241	830	324	1900	1211	2302	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is a person's stated satisfaction of living in Alaska, measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (low level of satisfaction) to 10 (high level of satisfaction). "Cons" ("Lib") is unity for conservatives (liberals). "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty five years old. "Rich" ("Poor") is unity for people with a household income at least \$70,000 (less than \$40,000). "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

6.2 Behavioral Responses

In addition to asking respondents about their likelihood of moving to Alaska and their expected life satisfaction of living there, we gave subjects the opportunity to learn more about Alaska, and estimate treatment effects on their willingness to do so. Specifically, after exposure to one of the Alaska-specific treatments discussed above, subjects receive the following message "If you would like to learn more about Alaska click on the links below." On the same page were descriptions and digital links to information about housing in Alaska (Alaska Zillow),[16] Indeed job openings for Alaska,[17] Information regarding life in Alaska,[18] and information about public school quality according to U.S News and World Report.[19] At the bottom of this list of four links was a message that explained the survey was complete and subjects could receive their payment using a provided code. This makes salient that viewing additional information about Alaska is purely optional and not required for payment.

We gauged people's behavioral response (as opposed to stated responses) by observing the amount of time subjects spend on this page (through use of a hidden timer on this landing page). We estimate that reading the 62 words on this page should take respondents about 10-20 seconds. We drop respondents who spent more than 6,000 seconds (100 minutes)[20] on this page to avoid potential outlier bias (the maximum time spent on this page was more than 12,000 seconds and the mean was 27 seconds). Here, we restrict the sample so so-called "Mobile" respondents, which we hypothesized ex ante (per our preregistration) to respond more strongly to treatment effects than other people.[21]

Table 6 gives the results from regressing the natural log of time spent learning about

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[16]https://www.zillow.com/homes/for_sale/AK_rb/
[17]https://www.indeed.com/jobs?q=&l=Alaska&vjk=645e6cd714aece3f
[18]https://livability.com/ak/
[19]https://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/alaska/rankings
[20]Restricting the sample to people who spent less than 6,000 seconds on this page was not pre registered.
[21]We asked people, "In terms of your ability and willingness to move to another state, which of the following best describes your situation?" and people indicated their type by answering "Mobile", "Rooted", or "Stuck". The results based on the full sample of people—not just the "mobile" ones—are reported in the appendix and show qualitatively smaller and statistically insignificant effects. Results based on "Mobile", "Rooted" and "Stuck" respondents are provided in online Appendix A, Table A6.

Alaska on the four treatment indicators. Pooling across all subjects and continuing to condition on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status, exposure to the PFD Info treatment increased the time people spent learning about Alaska by roughly 15% (p=0.038). We also document larger effects of exposure to the PFD treatment among employed, rich, and mature respondents. Consistent with our earlier results, here, the PFD treatment effect is especially large for conservative respondents (as opposed to liberal ones), but this effect lacks statistical significance. We find qualitatively smaller and statistically insignificant effects of exposure to the other treatments.[22]

Table 6: ln(Time Spent Learning About Alaska): Mobile Respondents

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.152**	0.333	0.0103	0.417*	0.176*	0.0462	0.206**	0.179
	(0.0730)	(0.259)	(0.187)	(0.237)	(0.106)	(0.150)	(0.0949)	(0.204)
Tax Info	0.0571	-0.0968	0.0140	0.217	0.0171	0.0453	0.0639	-0.0882
	(0.0713)	(0.286)	(0.173)	(0.210)	(0.109)	(0.133)	(0.0958)	(0.197)
Urban Info	0.0371	-0.273	-0.371**	0.186	0.00690	-0.144	0.130	-0.0838
	(0.0711)	(0.317)	(0.161)	(0.277)	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.0954)	(0.203)
Fiscal Info	-0.0309	-0.0954	-0.315*	0.159	-0.0223	0.0131	-0.0236	0.0224
	(0.0687)	(0.272)	(0.173)	(0.257)	(0.103)	(0.134)	(0.0893)	(0.193)
Constant	2.391***	2.825***	2.490***	2.507***	2.329***	2.462***	2.358***	2.307***
	(0.0751)	(0.326)	(0.166)	(0.232)	(0.102)	(0.0956)	(0.0793)	(0.190)
PFD-Tax Info	0.0946	0.430	-0.00369	0.199	0.159	0.000928	0.142	0.267
	0.0769	0.278	0.197	0.196	0.116	0.163	0.103	0.191
PFD-Urban Info	0.115	0.606**	0.381**	0.230	0.169	0.190	0.0762	0.263
	0.0770	0.303	0.190	0.278	0.106	0.161	0.103	0.195
PFD-Fiscal Info	0.183**	0.428*	0.326	0.258	0.198*	0.0331	0.230**	0.157
	0.0744	0.245	0.199	0.240	0.110	0.161	0.0974	0.177
R^2	0.0293	0.0713	0.0486	0.0586	0.0250	0.0413	0.0237	0.187
N	1779	100	316	112	845	430	1057	163

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is the natural log of time spent learning about Alaska among "Mobile" respondents (as opposed to "Rooted" or "Stuck"). "Cons" ("Lib") is unity for conservatives (liberals). "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty five years old. "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

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[22]We also explore treatment effects on i) the number of clicks respondents made on the page providing hyperlinks to information about Alaska (see online Appendix A Table A7, and ii) the likelihood of clicking on the Zillow hyperlink (Tables A8 and A9). For these additional behavioral outcomes, we document no meaningful treatment effects except among "Mobile" respondents who are more likely to click on the Zillow link after exposure to the PFD treatment.

7 Discussion: Stated vs. Revealed Preferences

The flexibility of our stated preference approach is limited by potential hypothetical bias on the part of subjects. In this section, we provide some further context to these limits and discuss how our results might be interpreted.

In the United States, interstate migration is uncommon. According to the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 5.4% of people moved across state lines between 2015 and 2020. Even among the most mobile demographic groups interstate moves are uncommon. For instance, among 25-29 year-olds 10.2% moved to a different state over a 5-year period, and among professional/graduate degree holders 7.5% moved. Our sample of Prolific users are non-representative of the broader population and likely over-indexed on more mobile households. The average 3-year migration probability (to a single state of their preference) was 20% in the control condition. Even considering the over-indexing, these stated preferences likely represent an upward bias relative to actual mobility. Similarly, around 0.04% of the United State's population migrates to Alaska in a 3-year period and 0.07% over a 5-year period, but respondents in our study averaged a 1% stated probability of making this move in the control condition. This over-estimation likely reflects the difficulty in judging tail probabilities and more straightforward effects of anchoring on integer answers.

Despite the observed likely over-estimation of migration propensity, there is internal consistency between stated migration probability in the control condition, and respondent's qualitatively self-described mobility. Those that self describe as mobile average a 33% 3-year migration probability in the control condition, those that self describe as "rooted" or "stuck" averaged 12%.

Koşar et al. (2022) provides evidence for the relationship between stated and revealed migration behavior. They survey households about their expected probability of moving in the next twelve months, then follow these same households to observe actual migration decisions. They find stated 12-month migration probabilities are highly predictive of a move over that time period. The relationship between stated probabilities and actual moves

is positive and monotonic, showing respondents are adept in estimating their migration decisions over the short term. Unsurprisingly, migration is under-predicted at the low end and over-predicted at the high end. Respondents who said that a move had zero probability of happening in the next year actually moved about 10% of the time. Respondents who said they had a 100% probability of a move in the next year followed through about 70% of the time. For our analysis, because we are interested only in the directional and relative effects of the treatments, monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient.

8   Conclusion

Cash-transfer programs have gained traction in recent years as vehicles to address poverty and reduce income inequality in the United States. However, at the sub-national level, cash-transfer programs have the potential to induce inward migration and balloon program cost. For example, existing literature has demonstrated that state-level tax cuts (Conway and Houtenville, 2001; Önder and Schlunk, 2019; Agrawal and Foremny, 2019) and increased wages (Kennan and Walker, 2011) attract labor from other states. But these estimates need not apply to cash transfers which could have distinct valuations due to mental accounting, cultural identity, and political ideology.

We designed a survey experiment to elicit individual preferences for cash transfers relative to other forms of financial gain. While combined into one instrument, we estimate relative preferences using three different experiments, each offering unique insights. Experiment 1 shows that most people (other than people on the political left and people who are not employed) prefer cash transfers to additional government spending, and people (other than conservatives, who are indifferent), prefer cash transfers to tax cuts. Experiment 2 gauges people's stated willingness to move after receiving hypothetical information about a i) cash transfer program, ii) tax cut, iii) reduction in the cost of living, or iv) wage increase. Consistent with the results from Experiment 1, here, people state higher probabilities of moving

after exposure to the cash-transfer treatment relative to the tax-cut treatment. We also document larger cash-transfer treatment effects among the poor and not fully employed. In Experiment 3, respondents are exposed to one of four informational treatments surrounding Alaska's i) real-world cash transfer program, ii) tax structure, iii) largest urban area, Anchorage, or iv) fiscal structure. Relative to those in the control group (who received innocuous information about Alaska), respondents exposed to the Alaska cash-transfer treatment state higher probabilities of moving to Alaska, higher expected life satisfaction associated with living there, and even spend more (costly) time learning about life in Alaska.

Considered jointly with existing estimates of the tax elasticity of migration, our estimates can be used to generate a reasonable lower bound on the cash-transfer elasticity of migration; if people prefer cash transfers to tax cuts, the cash-transfer elasticity of migration should be no smaller than that for tax cuts. We conclude that the implementation of state or local cash transfer programs would indeed likely attract new residents from other areas, and these people are disproportionately likely to be poor, not fully employed.

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Appendix A: Additional Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics (Mean Values by Group)

	Lib	Cons	Mature	Poor	Rich	Employed	Not Employed
Pooled:	.197	.057	.076	.288	.451	.547	.124
Experiment 1 Treatments:							
Tax Cuts vs. Spending	.192	.052	.078	.280	.462	.549	.122
Cash Transfer vs. Spending	.201	.062	.074	.295	.440	.545	.125
Experiment 2 Treatments:							
Control	.201	.062	.067	.289	.463	.557	.120
Cash Transfer	.188	.060	.071	.269	.452	.575	.118
Tax Cut	.213	.042	.072	.289	.446	.535	.109
COL	.193	.061	.105	.302	.442	.533	.158
Wages	.187	.062	.068	.289	.456	.537	.113
Experiment 3 Treatments:							
Control	.205	.065	.064	.306	.466	.550	.118
PFD	.199	.042	.073	.279	.452	.531	.138
Tax	.197	.055	.081	.270	.464	.570	.122
Urban	.165	.054	.078	.279	.462	.553	.124
Fiscal	.220	.069	.087	.304	.414	.531	.116

Notes: "Lib" ("Cons") is unity for people who report to be 1 (7) on a seven-point Likert scale measuring political alignment. "Mature" is unity for people at least sixty-five years old. "Poor" ("Rich") is unity for people with a household income less than \$40,000 (more than \$70,000). "Emp" ("No Emp") is unity for people employed full time (not working and not looking). Mean values are reported for each treatment within the three different experiments.

Table A2 through Table A5 present the results from exploring additional dimensions of heterogeneity. Table A2 and Table A3 show estimated effects of household size on migration propensity and life satisfaction given an interstate move. All treatments in Experiment 2 (for which the outcomes are a person's stated likelihood of moving to a state, and expected life satisfaction of living in a state) scale the size of financial benefit that respondents see by the same \$2,000 per member of a respondent's household.

The cash transfer, tax cut, and cost-of-living treatments in Experiment 2 include text that explicitly link the monetary value of the treatment (cash transfer, tax cut, or cost of living adjustment) to household size. For example, in the cash-transfer treatment, subjects are told that "every person in your household is eligible to receive the payment". To avoid awkward phrasing or confusion, we did not write the text of the wage treatment in the same way (wage offers are seldom linked to family size). In other words, the wage treatment is

still scaled by household size, but respondents are not specifically informed about how the size of the wage treatment varies according to household size. As shown in Table Table A2, stated willingness to move is only weakly associated with household size. The largest marginal effect is for the cash-transfer treatment, for which a unit increase in household size is associated with a 1.7% point (10%) increase in the effect of the cash-transfer treatment on a person's stated likelihood of moving. For the wage treatment, we observe a marginally smaller and statistically insignificant heterogeneous effect of family size.

Household size also may also influence treatment effect sizes in Experiment 3. Specifically, if randomized into the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) treatment, subjects are told that all members of their household are eligible for a Permanent Fund Dividend, and a hypothetical, representative payment for their household is calculated. This is the only Alaska-information treatment that explicitly references household size in the text. We find that a unit increase in household size increases the effect of the PFD treatment on a person's stated likelihood of moving to Alaska by 0.952 percentage points. However, we document similar heterogeneities based off of family size within the Tax information, and even the Urban information treatments.

We also explore how home-location characteristics correlate with hypothetical migration propensity and life satisfaction. We separate these geographic-origin results from our main respondent-specific characteristics to simplify presentation of the main results which theoretically better motivated. Following our pre-registration plan, here, we explore heterogeneities based on whether a person lives in i) an oil-rich state (defined as being a top ten oil-dependent state according to James and Rivera (2022)), ii) low tax state (defined as being a top ten state in terms of business taxes climate according to the Tax Foundation), and iii) an urban zip code. We document minimal sources of heterogeneity across these home-location characteristics.

9   Appendix B: Survey Instrument

Quality of Life in Your State and Others

Q70 This study is designed to help researchers better understand people's preferences and motivations for moving geographic locations. The survey will last less than five minutes, and your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Within the survey, you will be given a description of a place, and then asked to describe your preference and willingness to move there. You may stop at any time. Declining to participate or stopping your participation will not have any negative effects on you. Your answers will be anonymously recorded. You may ask about your rights as a research participant. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA) Office of Research Integrity and Compliance at 907-786-1099 or uaa_oric@alaska.edu. You may also contact the University of Wyoming IRB Administrator at 307-766-5322. By clicking on the "Next" button below you give us consent to use your responses in our academic research study. Thank you for your participation in this study!

Page Break

Q71 We are conducting a survey to learn more about the characteristics of Prolific users. When you are finished with the survey you will be given a code to enter into Prolific. Entering the correct code is essential for you to receive payment. Do not close your browser until you have written down your code.

Page Break

prolific id Please enter your Prolific ID.

_____

- -

✱

Age What is your age?

_____

Gender Gender

○ Male (1)

○ Female (2)

○ Non-binary / third gender (3)

○ Prefer not to say (4)

✱

HHsize How many people (including you) live in your household?

_____

Married Marital Status

○ Currently Married (4)

○ Not Currently Married (5)

✱

Kids How many people in your household are younger than 18?

_____

Income What is your household's total income from all sources?

○ (1)

○ $15,000 - 30,000 (2)

○ $30,001 - 40,000 (3)

○ $40,001 - 55,000 (4)

○ $55,001 - 70,000 (6)

○ $70,000 - 90,000 (7)

○ $90,001 - 110,000 (8)

○ $110,001 - 150,000 (9)

○ $150,001 - 200,000 (10)

○ >200,001 (11)

Employment Besides Prolific, what other work do you do?

○ Employed Full-time (1)

○ Employed Part-time (2)

○ Not employed, but looking (3)

○ Not employed, not looking (4)

○ Other/Self-employed (5)

Education What is your highest level of education?

○ Less than High School (1)

○ High School or GED (2)

○ Some College (3)

○ Associates Degree or Vocational Certification (4)

○ 4-year Bachelor's Degree (5)

○ Graduate Degree   (6)

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loss aversion Imagine you are offered to play a coin flip game for free. If a head is flipped you win $20. If a tail is flipped you pay $10. Would you choose to play this lottery?

○ Yes (1)

○ No (4)

CurrentState What state do you currently live in?

▼ Alabama (52) ... Wyoming (102)

---

zip Please enter your zip code below:

_____

⤬

mobility In terms of your ability and willingness to move to another state, which of the following best describes your situation?

○ Mobile - am open to, and able to move if an opportunity comes along (1)

○ Stuck - would like to move but am trapped in place and unable to move (2)

○ Rooted - am strongly embedded in my community and don't want to move (3)

⤳

Vote2020 Who did you vote for in the 2020 Election for President

○ Donald Trump, Republican (1)

○ Joe Biden, Democrat (2)

○ Other (3)

○ Did not vote/not eligible (4)

PoliticalLean People often describe themselves as being on a spectrum of the political left (liberal) or political right (conservative). How would you describe yourself?

○ 0 Left (Liberal) (0)

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 Right (Conservative) (6)

- -

GovtSize Would you say the current size of the federal government is

○ Too big (1)

○ About right (2)

○ Too small (3)

End of Block: Demographics

Start of Block: Pro-social Preferences

Prosocial_self Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving you $2,000 per year) or issuing a cash payment (worth $2,000 per year to you). Which would you prefer?

○ 0 (0)

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

○ 8 (8)

○ 9 (9)

○ 10 (10)

Prosocial_like Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving people like you $2000 per year) or issuing a cash payment (worth $2,000 per year to people like you). Which would you prefer?

○ 0 (0)

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

○ 8 (8)

○ 9 (9)

○ 10 (10)

Prosocial_everyone Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes (saving everyone $2,000 per year) or issuing a cash payment (worth $2,000 per year to everyone). Which would you prefer?

○ 0 (0)

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

○ 8 (8)

○ 9 (9)

○ 10 (10)

Fungible_tax_social Imagine your state was deciding between cutting taxes for people like you (saving you $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?

- ○ 0 (0)
- ○ 1 (1)
- ○ 2 (2)
- ○ 3 (3)
- ○ 4 (4)
- ○ 5 (5)
- ○ 6 (6)
- ○ 7 (7)
- ○ 8 (8)
- ○ 9 (9)
- ○ 10 (10)

Fungible_cash_social Imagine your state was deciding between issuing a cash payment to people like you (worth $2,000 per year) or increasing spending for education and health care. Which would you prefer?

○ 0 (0)

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

○ 8 (8)

○ 9 (9)

○ 10 (10)

⤬

OtherStateYesNo Have you ever lived in a different state than ${CurrentState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}

○ No (1)

○ Yes (2)

Skip To: DestinationState If Have you ever lived in a different state than ${q://QID9/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} = No

OtherStates Which states have you previously lived in? Select all that apply.

☐ Alabama (103)

☐ Alaska (104)

☐ Arizona (105)

☐ Arkansas (106)

☐ California (107)

☐ Colorado (108)

☐ Connecticut (109)

☐ Delaware (110)

☐ District of Columbia (111)

☐ Florida (112)

☐ Georgia (113)

☐ Hawaii (114)

☐ Idaho (115)

☐ Illinois (116)

☐ Indiana (117)

☐ Iowa (118)

☐   Kansas (119)

☐   Kentucky (120)

☐   Louisiana (121)

☐   Maine (122)

☐   Maryland (123)

☐   Massachusetts (124)

☐   Michigan (125)

☐   Minnesota (126)

☐   Mississippi (127)

☐   Missouri (128)

☐   Montana (129)

☐   Nebraska (130)

☐   Nevada (131)

☐   New Hampshire (132)

☐   New Jersey (133)

☐   New Mexico (134)

- [ ] New York (135)

- [ ] North Carolina (136)

- [ ] North Dakota (137)

- [ ] Ohio (138)

- [ ] Oklahoma (139)

- [ ] Oregon (140)

- [ ] Pennsylvania (141)

- [ ] Rhode Island (142)

- [ ] South Carolina (143)

- [ ] South Dakota (144)

- [ ] Tennessee (145)

- [ ] Texas (146)

- [ ] Utah (147)

- [ ] Vermont (148)

- [ ] Virginia (149)

- [ ] Washington (150)

☐ West Virginia (151)

☐ Wisconsin (152)

☐ Wyoming (153)

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DestinationState If you were to move away from the state you currently live in, what is your most likely destination? (Choose one state).

○ Alabama (52)

○ Alaska (53)

○ Arizona (54)

○ Arkansas (55)

○ California (56)

○ Colorado (57)

○ Connecticut (58)

○ Delaware (59)

○ District of Columbia (60)

○ Florida (61)

○ Georgia (62)

○ Hawaii (63)

○ Idaho (64)

○ Illinois (65)

○ Indiana (66)

○ Iowa (67)

○ Kansas (68)

○ Kentucky (69)

○ Louisiana (70)

○ Maine (71)

○ Maryland (72)

○ Massachusetts (73)

○ Michigan (74)

○ Minnesota (75)

○ Mississippi (76)

○ Missouri (77)

○ Montana (78)

○ Nebraska (79)

○ Nevada (80)

○ New Hampshire (81)

○ New Jersey (82)

○ New Mexico (83)

○ New York (84)

○ North Carolina (85)

○ North Dakota (86)

○ Ohio (87)

○ Oklahoma (88)

○ Oregon (89)

○ Pennsylvania (90)

○ Rhode Island (91)

○ South Carolina (92)

○ South Dakota (93)

○ Tennessee (94)

○ Texas (95)

○ Utah (96)

○ Vermont (97)

○ Virginia (98)

○ Washington (99)

○ West Virginia (100)

○ Wisconsin (101)

○ Wyoming (102)

✳

Control Thinking about the next three years, how likely are you to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

_____

✳

CashTransfer Imagine ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} implements a program that would pay every resident (regardless of age or employment status) $2,000 per year. Because every person in your household is eligible to receive the payments, that would be a total of $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 2000}.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next

three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

✳

TaxCut Imagine ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} implements a tax cut based on household size ($2,000 per person regardless of age or employment status). For your household the tax cut would total $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 2000} per year.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

✳

COL Imagine ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} experienced a reduction in its current cost of living (saving households $2,000 per person). For your household, the reduced cost of living would total $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 2000} per year.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

✳

Wages
Imagine ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} experienced
a $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 2000} per year increase in wages for jobs that might interest you.

Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next

three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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gen satisfaction Thinking about the hypothetical scenario described in the previous question, how satisfied would you be with your life if you were to move to ${DestinationState/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}?

○ 0 (Not at all satisfied) (1)

○ 1 (2)

○ 2 (3)

○ 3 (4)

○ 4 (5)

○ 5 (6)

○ 6 (7)

○ 7 (8)

○ 8 (9)

○ 9 (10)

○ 10 (Very satisfied) (11)

Q50 Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there.

⤨

pfd info
Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not.

Every Alaskan resident, regardless of age, is eligible to receive a Permanent Fund Dividend Check (PFD). Its value varies from year to year, but is typically between $1,000 and $3,000. So, a household of your size would receive between $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 1000} and $$e{q://QID4/ChoiceTextEntryValue * 3000} each year.

Which of the following apply to you? (click all that apply)

☐   I did not previously know anything about the Permanent Fund Dividend Check program (0)

☐   I previously knew that Alaska paid checks, but thought the average check size was smaller (1)

☐   I previously knew that Alaska paid checks, but thought the average check size was larger (2)

☐   I previously knew that Alaska paid checks, but did not know every Alaskan resident is eligible to receive it (3)

☐   None of the above (11)

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Page Break ——

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pfd info answ Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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Page Break ——————————————————

Q58 Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there.

Page Break ———————————————————————————————

ak tax info

Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not.

Alaska is the only state without a broad-based tax. While Alaskans pay local taxes, they do not pay any state income, sales, or property tax.

Which of the following apply to you? (click all that apply)

☐   I did not previously know that Alaska does not have a state income tax (0)

☐   I did not previously know that Alaska does not have a state sales tax (1)

☐   I did not previously know that Alaska does not have a state property tax (2)

☐   I did not previously know that Alaska is the only state without broad-based taxes (3)

☐   None of the above (11)

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Page Break ————————————————————————————

✳

ak tax info answ Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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Page Break ——————————————————————————————

Q61 Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there.

ak urban info

Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not.

Alaska's largest city is Anchorage and is home to roughly 300,000 people. For reference, it's larger than Boise Idaho, Reno Nevada, and Greensboro North Carolina. The city is home to dozens of breweries, award-winning restaurants, and major retailers like Target, Costco, and Home Depot.

Which of the following apply to you? (click all that apply)

○ I previously thought Anchorage was smaller than it is (0)

○ I previously thought Anchorage was larger than it is (1)

○ None of the above (12)

Page Break

✳

ak urban info answ Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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Page Break ──────────────────────────

Q64 Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there.

Page Break ──────────────

ak def info

Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not.

Recently, the State of Alaska has experienced large budget deficits, leading to significant cuts to education, public health, and infrastructure spending. It's a habitual problem in the state resulting from its dependence on oil which creates repeating "boom and bust" cycles in the economy.

Which of the following apply to you (click all that apply)

☐   I did not previously know that oil contributes to a boom and bust cycle in Alaska's economy (0)

☐   I did not previously know that recent budget deficits have affected state spending in Alaska (1)

☐   I did not previously know that Alaska habitually cuts public spending when oil prices are low (11)

☐   None of the above (12)

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Page Break ————————————————————————————————————

*

ak def info answ Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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Page Break ————————————————————————————————————

Q31 Next, we are going to share some information about a selected state and gauge your interest in moving there.

Page Break ───────────────────────────────────

ak flag info
Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States. The state flag displays eight gold stars, forming the Big Dipper and Polaris, on a dark blue field. The state flower is the forget-me-not.

Which of the following apply to you? (check all that apply)

☐ I previously knew that Alaska was the 49th state admitted to the United States (0)

☐ I previously knew that Alaska's state flag is the Big Dipper (1)

☐ I previously knew Alaska's state flower is the forget-me-not (11)

☐ None of the above (12)

Page Break

✳

ak flag info answ Thinking about the next three years, how likely would you say you are to move to Alaska, where 0 is definitely not moving in the next three years and 100 is definitely moving in the next three years.

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Page Break ————————————————————————

ak satisfaction How satisfied with your life do you think you would be if you were to move to Alaska?

○ 0 (Not at all satisfied) (1)

○ 1 (2)

○ 2 (3)

○ 3 (4)

○ 4 (5)

○ 5 (6)

○ 6 (7)

○ 7 (8)

○ 8 (9)

○ 9 (11)

○ 10 (Very Satsified) (12)

Q36 Timing
First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)

JS

ak links
 If you would like to learn more about Alaska click on the links below.

- Zillow's home listings for Alaska Click here

- Indeed job openings in Alaska Click here

- Information regarding life in Alaska Click here

- US News and World Reports information on public schools in Alaska Click here

You have completed the survey. Your Prolific code is CA7H4XVR

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comments Thank you for your time. Our survey is designed to help us better understand people's motivations for moving. If you would like to leave any comments or offer any suggestions regarding our survey design, please do so below.

_____

Table A2: Willingness to Move & Satisfaction: By Household Size

	WT Move	Satisfaction
Cash Transfer	16.83***	0.260
	(3.137)	(0.225)
Cash Transfer×HH Size	1.763*	0.0295
	(1.034)	(0.0749)
Tax Cut	11.83***	0.156
	(2.940)	(0.218)
Tax Cut×HH Size	1.385	0.0285
	(0.963)	(0.0725)
COL	18.11***	0.279
	(2.991)	(0.227)
COL×HH Size	1.262	0.0244
	(1.003)	(0.0771)
Wages	20.39***	-0.00790
	(3.107)	(0.221)
Wages×HH Size	0.851	0.102
	(1.012)	(0.0718)
HHsize	0.0611	-0.00517
	(0.588)	(0.0571)
Constant	22.58***	7.746***
	(2.214)	(0.189)
R^2	0.0871	0.0181
N	4208	4208

Notes: The outcome variable in column 1 is a person's stated likelihood of moving to another state in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) The outcome in column 2 is a person's stated expected life satisfaction of moving to another state in the next three years, measured on an eleven-point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unsatisfied, and 10 very satisfied). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. Coefficients are reported on indicators for each of the four treatments, as well as the treatment indicators interacted with total household size. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A3: Willingness to Move to, and Satisfaction of Living in, Alaska: By Household Size

	WT Move to AK	Satisfaction in AK
PFD Info	2.286	0.303
	(1.631)	(0.210)
PFD×HH Size	0.952*	0.00613
	(0.516)	(0.0592)
Tax Info	0.861	-0.0871
	(1.337)	(0.203)
Tax×HH Size	1.204***	0.128**
	(0.448)	(0.0636)
Urban Info	-1.097	0.259
	(1.094)	(0.210)
Urban×HH Size	0.782**	-0.0380
	(0.358)	(0.0657)
Fiscal Info	-1.969**	-0.453**
	(0.925)	(0.185)
Fiscal×HH Size	0.250	-0.0186
	(0.247)	(0.0503)
Constant	5.315***	4.344***
	(0.823)	(0.126)
R^2	0.0333	0.0191
N	4208	4208

Notes: In column 1, the outcome variable is a person's stated likeliness to move to Alaska in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) In column 2, the outcome variable is a person's stated satisfaction of living in Alaska, measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (low level of satisfaction) to 10 (high level of satisfaction). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. Coefficients are reported on indicators for each of the four treatments, as well as the treatment indicators interacted with total household size. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A4: Willingness to Move & Satisfaction: By Respondent Location

	WT Move			Expected Satisfaction		
	Oil Rich	Low Tax	Urban Zip	Oil Rich	Low Tax	Urban Zip
Cash Transfer	19.55***	20.61***	20.99***	0.740***	0.507*	0.358**
	(4.348)	(3.913)	(2.278)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.147)
Tax Cut	14.16***	12.89***	16.18***	0.264	0.400	0.264*
	(4.137)	(3.756)	(2.104)	(0.286)	(0.265)	(0.146)
Cost of Living	23.37***	23.92***	18.92***	0.977***	0.772***	0.540***
	(4.544)	(3.857)	(2.140)	(0.283)	(0.260)	(0.142)
Wages	24.01***	20.60***	20.25***	0.532*	0.696***	0.265*
	(4.489)	(3.709)	(2.119)	(0.273)	(0.252)	(0.143)
Constant	23.64***	26.13***	23.80***	7.781***	7.632***	7.531***
	(4.521)	(3.957)	(2.292)	(0.253)	(0.262)	(0.152)
R^2	0.101	0.0951	0.0770	0.0695	0.0535	0.0190
N	526	694	1954	526	694	1954

Notes: The outcome variable in columns 1-3 is a person's stated likelihood of moving to another state in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) The outcome in columns 4-6 is a person's stated expected life satisfaction of moving to another state in the next three years, measured on an eleven-point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unsatisfied, and 10 very satisfied). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. Coefficients are reported on indicators for each of the four treatments, as well as the treatment indicators interacted with total household size. Oil Rich is unity for people currently living in a top-ten oil-rich state. Low Tax is unity for respondents currently living in one of ten states with the most favorable tax climate according to The Tax Foundation. Urban Zip is unity for people living in a zip code which entirely urban. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A5: Willingness to Move to, and Expected Satisfaction from Living in, Alaska: By Respondent Location

	WT Move to AK			Expected AK Satisfaction		
	Oil Rich	Low Tax	Urban Zip	Oil Rich	Low Tax	Urban Zip
PFD Info	5.879**	1.626	5.694***	0.127	0.0192	0.505***
	(2.515)	(1.719)	(1.275)	(0.369)	(0.314)	(0.178)
Tax Info	6.754**	2.059	3.008**	-0.346	0.0703	0.243
	(2.887)	(1.602)	(1.190)	(0.358)	(0.318)	(0.176)
Urban Info	-1.072	1.292	1.103	-0.240	0.0725	0.214
	(1.878)	(1.787)	(1.096)	(0.354)	(0.326)	(0.175)
Fiscal Info	-1.033	-0.736	-0.853	-0.510	-0.510	-0.446***
	(1.939)	(1.498)	(0.959)	(0.352)	(0.310)	(0.170)
Constant	8.782***	5.852***	6.115***	4.837***	4.281***	4.139***
	(2.510)	(1.795)	(1.266)	(0.392)	(0.314)	(0.185)
R^2	0.0555	0.0130	0.0314	0.0190	0.0128	0.0240
N	526	694	1954	526	694	1954

Notes: In columns 1-3, the outcome variable is a person's stated likeliness to move to Alaska in the next three years, measured on a 100 point Likert scale (0 corresponds to very unlikely to move, and 100 very likely to move.) In columns 3-5, the outcome variable is a person's stated satisfaction of living in Alaska, measured on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (low level of satisfaction) to 10 (high level of satisfaction). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. Oil Rich is unity for people currently living in a top-ten oil-rich state. Low Tax is unity for respondents currently living in one of ten states with the most favorable tax climate according to The Tax Foundation. Urban Zip is unity for people living in a zip code which entirely urban. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A6: ln(Time Spent Learning About Alaska)

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.0586	0.0829	0.0746	0.113	0.0317	0.115	0.0841	0.141
	(0.0466)	(0.201)	(0.108)	(0.164)	(0.0696)	(0.0913)	(0.0641)	(0.110)
Tax Info	0.0833*	0.138	0.129	-0.108	0.0830	0.0177	0.159**	-0.111
	(0.0470)	(0.165)	(0.104)	(0.148)	(0.0724)	(0.0858)	(0.0649)	(0.111)
Urban Info	-0.000705	-0.109	-0.118	-0.146	0.00693	-0.110	0.0805	0.00282
	(0.0461)	(0.188)	(0.0959)	(0.159)	(0.0692)	(0.0821)	(0.0648)	(0.112)
Fiscal Info	-0.0214	0.249	-0.0893	-0.0527	-0.0611	0.00529	-0.0417	0.0649
	(0.0444)	(0.170)	(0.0971)	(0.157)	(0.0664)	(0.0849)	(0.0587)	(0.112)
Constant	2.425***	2.355***	2.368***	2.755***	2.365***	2.475***	2.270***	2.372***
	(0.0476)	(0.190)	(0.0977)	(0.147)	(0.0678)	(0.0661)	(0.0561)	(0.100)
R^2	0.0244	0.0461	0.0290	0.0490	0.0146	0.0412	0.0102	0.110
N	4207	241	830	323	1900	1211	2302	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is the natural log of time spent learning about Alaska. Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A7: Click Count Learning About Alaska

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.0180	-0.0284	-0.0933	0.707***	-0.0767	-0.0908	0.105	0.232
	(0.0951)	(0.383)	(0.205)	(0.271)	(0.141)	(0.190)	(0.131)	(0.212)
Tax Info	0.0616	0.171	-0.000609	0.00720	0.0771	0.0161	0.180	-0.0408
	(0.0989)	(0.341)	(0.244)	(0.219)	(0.141)	(0.217)	(0.131)	(0.207)
Urban Info	-0.150	-0.569*	-0.194	0.00621	-0.196	-0.218	-0.112	-0.178
	(0.0937)	(0.305)	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.133)	(0.198)	(0.129)	(0.199)
Fiscal Info	-0.0122	0.158	-0.164	0.449*	-0.0961	0.0367	-0.131	0.100
	(0.104)	(0.323)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.142)	(0.239)	(0.121)	(0.209)
Constant	2.140***	1.588***	2.335***	1.586***	2.134***	2.273***	1.949***	1.798***
	(0.0996)	(0.366)	(0.217)	(0.265)	(0.140)	(0.174)	(0.113)	(0.186)
R^2	0.00792	0.0448	0.0125	0.0474	0.00593	0.00620	0.00933	0.0164
N	4208	241	830	324	1900	1211	2302	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is the number of times a respondent clicked on the page providing hyperlinks to information about Alaska. Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A8: Clicked on the Zillow Hyperlink

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.00846	-0.0363	0.0304	0.0821**	0.000209	0.0179	-0.00465	0.0541*
	(0.00918)	(0.0413)	(0.0193)	(0.0356)	(0.0144)	(0.0181)	(0.0111)	(0.0291)
Tax Info	0.0148	-0.0377	0.0348*	0.0600**	0.0106	0.0132	0.0198	0.00562
	(0.00957)	(0.0384)	(0.0206)	(0.0293)	(0.0150)	(0.0183)	(0.0127)	(0.0249)
Urban Info	0.00786	-0.0245	0.0168	0.0186	-0.00368	-0.00285	0.0194	-0.00860
	(0.00913)	(0.0368)	(0.0193)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)	(0.0153)	(0.0128)	(0.0203)
Fiscal Info	-0.00102	-0.0415	-0.00886	0.0572**	-0.00993	0.00999	-0.00864	0.0130
	(0.00861)	(0.0365)	(0.0127)	(0.0272)	(0.0138)	(0.0165)	(0.0106)	(0.0243)
Constant	0.0260***	0.0161	0.00776	-0.0263	0.0343***	0.0446***	0.0301**	-0.0131
	(0.00889)	(0.0319)	(0.0185)	(0.0239)	(0.0123)	(0.0145)	(0.0120)	(0.0265)
R^2	0.00440	0.0509	0.0131	0.0249	0.00433	0.00823	0.00669	0.0306
N	4208	241	830	324	1900	1211	2302	521

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is unity for people who clicked on the Zillow hyperlink to learn about housing opportunities in Alaska and zero otherwise. Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.

Table A9: Clicked on the Zillow Hyperlink: Mobile Residents

	Pooled	Cons	Lib	Mature	Rich	Poor	Emp	No Emp
PFD Info	0.0292**	-0.00727	0.0221	0.0787	0.0489**	-0.00674	0.00891	0.104*
	(0.0148)	(0.0674)	(0.0364)	(0.0626)	(0.0230)	(0.0301)	(0.0177)	(0.0553)
Tax Info	0.00566	-0.0509	0.00987	0.0463	0.00829	-0.00852	0.0150	-0.0141
	(0.0123)	(0.0465)	(0.0336)	(0.0487)	(0.0174)	(0.0293)	(0.0180)	(0.0171)
Urban Info	0.0193	-0.0510	0.00788	0.0388	0.00510	0.00541	0.0227	-0.0208
	(0.0135)	(0.0483)	(0.0335)	(0.0417)	(0.0165)	(0.0296)	(0.0188)	(0.0146)
Fiscal Info	0.0106	-0.0495	-0.0176	0.0854	0.00178	0.0410	-0.0103	0.0519
	(0.0129)	(0.0469)	(0.0268)	(0.0561)	(0.0171)	(0.0349)	(0.0150)	(0.0395)
Constant	0.0331**	-0.00600	0.0462	0.00862	0.0252	0.0756***	0.0426**	-0.0666**
	(0.0135)	(0.0465)	(0.0395)	(0.0446)	(0.0170)	(0.0274)	(0.0176)	(0.0323)
R^2	0.00915	0.0912	0.0284	0.0412	0.0137	0.0351	0.00913	0.101
N	1779	100	316	112	845	430	1057	163

Notes: For each column, the outcome variable is unity for people who clicked on the Zillow hyperlink to learn about housing opportunities in Alaska and zero otherwise. The sample is restricted to respondents who stated to be "Mobile" (rather than geographically "Rooted" or "Stuck"). Estimates are conditioned on indicators for being liberal, conservative, mature, poor, rich, and employment status. $***$, $**$, $*$, represent 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.